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A method of futures research is used to empirically test a 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model in a marketing 
setting. It is proposed that within the macroenvironment there 
exist, varying levels of resource constraints and structural 
fluctuations which are positively correlated. Increased 
resource constraints and structural fluctuations, which are 
characteristics of a turbulent environment, are expected to 
increase the competititive intensity in an industry. This higher 
level of competitive intensity is hypothesized to result in 
increased use of nonprice marketing strategies. Nonprice 
marketing strategies are also expected to increase business 
performance because of the contingency relationship be. 
tween conduct (strategy) and performance. The possible role 
of "'blind" luck or stochastic processes in determining suc- 
cess is also discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm 
which is well developed in the industrial economics literature 
(Caves 1964, Weiss 1971, Vernon 1972, Scberer 1980) has 
received little explicit attention in marketing. This is unfor- 
tunate because marketers often deal with constructs which 
_can be derived from the abstract SCP paradigm. For example, 
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the external environments which marketers address including 
the competitive environment can characterize the "struc- 
ture" of the environment a firm is constrained by; the market- 
ing mix decisions are typical of the f'Lrm "conduct" construct; 
and a orientation toward customer satisfaction and 
profitability are representative of the "performance" con- 
struct)  
The purpose of this article is to use the SCP paradigm to 
derive constructs that can be fashioned together in a causal 
nexus to explain marketing phenomena. In this regard we 
posit that resource constraints and structural fluctuations im- 
pact competitive intensity (these are structure constructs), 
which in turn influence nonprice competitive strategy (this is 
a conduct construct), which is expected to influence business 
performance (this is a performance construct). We also offer 
an empirical test of these causal associations. In an attempt to 
explore a new survey research orientation in marketing this 
theory will be vitalized using an approach drawn from "fu- 
aries research" methods. If our attempts at deriving sys- 
tematic propositions from the abstract SCP paradigm are 
fruitful, then support will be obtained for future attempts to 
use the SCP paradigm in scholarly research in marketing. 
In the pages that follow, a theory which fleshes out some 
of the critical components of the SCP model is derived. 
Hypotheses based on this theory are then postulated. A 
sample of high ranking executives are asked to forecast the 
future business environment and to speculate about the likely 
strategy which is evoked by their predictions. This futures 
forecast becomes the basis for a Lisxel analysis which tests 
the proposed hypotheses. Finally, implications for the struc- 
ture-conduct-performance orientation are discussed and re- 
lated to marketing strategy. 
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THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The theory to be developed relates to the SCP model 
portrayed in Exhibit 1. The model has three theoretical con- 
structs: structure, conduct, and performance? From the 
theoretical construct of structure is derived three constructs 
at a lower level of abstraction and these are resource con- 
straints, structural fluctuations, and competitive intensity. In 
Exhibit 1 the theoretical constructs are linked to derived 
constructs by straight lines without arrows. Derived from the 
theoretical construct of conduct is nonprice competitive 
strategy and derived from the performance construct is busi- 
ness pcrfolTnance. 
Hypotheses will be developed in the following sections that 
link the derived constructs together. When the derived con- 
structs are linked by a straight line with an arrow we are 
hypothesizing a causal direction; on the other hand when two 
derived constructs are linked by a curved line with an arrow 
at both ends we are predicting a correlated relationship but no 
causal direction. Superimposed on these lines are numbers 
which represent the hypothesis number to be discussed in the 
theory development section that follows. On preview of Ex- 
hibit 1 we note that Hypothesis 1 posits that structural fluc- 
tuations and resource constraints are positively related. 
Hypothesis 2 argues that resource constraints influence com- 
petitive intensity and Hypothesis 3 suggests that structural 
fluctuations influence competitive intensity. In Hypothesis 4 
we predict that competitive intensity influences nonprice 
competitive strategies. Finally, Hypothesis 5 predicts non- 
price competitive strategy will influence business perfor- 
mance. 
The model in Exhibit 1, which will be given theoretical 
support and empirically tested, is simple but does represent a 
preliminary attempt to use the SCP paradigm in marketing. 
More detailed and complex models are left to future research 
efforts. 
Paradigm Component #1: Structure 
Definition 
As a sociological construct, structure may be defined as 
tim arrangement of parts or the pattern of organization in a 
social system. Thus, structure involves the notion of systems. 
Glasser and Halliday (1980, p. 918) state that "at  its core, 
systems theory is concerned with the ways in which a given 
set of elements is related . . . .  "Consequently, this article will 
rely heavily on concepts from systems theory as well as the 
fundamental attributes of systems. 
EXHIBIT1 
SCPModel 
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Open~Closed Systems 
A closed system does not import energy; an open system 
does import energy (Dowling 1983). According to the second 
law of thermodynamics, a closed system experiences increas- 
ing entropy (that is, the loss of potential) over time. On the 
other hand, open systems because they can import energy, are 
able to avoid entropic processes. A closed system typically 
has a simpler structure because only the parts within the 
system need to be related to the whole (Emery and Trist 1965, 
p. 21). In contrast, an open system requires not only that 
processes within a system be structured but also that the 
relations between system and environment be established 
along with the relationship between parts of the environment 
(Emery and Trist 1965, p. 22; Dowling 1983, p. 24). 
Resource Constraints 
Energy is the ability to do work and all systems require 
energy. At a high level of abstraction any resource is a form 
of energy. Oil is energy, water is energy, human labor is 
energy, knowledge or "know-how" is energy. Zimmerman 
(1951) suggests that the critical systemic resource is informa- 
tion (or know-how) because it is used to transform "neutral 
stuff" into resources. For example, oil was neutral matter 
until we knew what to do with it. Open systems although they 
have the ability to import energy, will at times experience 
resource or energy constraints. These constraints will in- 
fluence the functioning of the system. Our first derived con- 
struct deals with these resource constraints which we define 
as the extent to which the system is unable to obtain all the 
resources necessary for suitable functioning. 
Structural Fluctuations 
When systems are unable to obtain the necessary resources, 
they begin to break apart; entropy and eventually chaos sets 
in. This increase in entropy (that is, the deterioration of 
existing resources) results in a disequilibrium which causes 
structuralfluctuations to materialize (Monieson 1981). 
In the management literature, the close relationship be- 
tween resource constraints and structural fluctuations was 
most ably pointed out by Emery and Trist (1965) within their 
articulation of the concept of the turbulent environment. 
Basically, environments were turbulent when interconnected 
organizations (for example, competitors) were concurrently 
seeking limited resources. When sufficient resources were 
not attracted, one Outcome was structural fluctuation. Ter- 
reberry (1968) extended these insights when she contended 
that most organizational climates were becoming more tur- 
bulent and uncertain. 
Reidenbach and Oliva (1982) also underscore the impor- 
tance of studying structural fluctuations in marketing systems 
by relating these fluctuations to morphogenesis. "The 
problem of morphogenesis deals with the nature of structural 
changes at various system levels. The essence of mor- 
phogenesis dictates that macromarketing models must 
be capable of explaining and predicting the structural 
dynamism inherent within social systems" (Reidenbaeh and 
Oliva 1982, p. 243). Importantly, the structural dynamism 
stimulated by structural fluctuations is the source of new 
order (Prigogine 1978). Consequently, our second derived 
construct deals with structuralfluctuations and is defined as 
the oscillations in structure that occur when the system is in 
disequilibrium. 
Structural fluctuations and resource constraints should be 
positively associated because as the system experiences 
resource constraints the existing structures will begin to break 
apart (that is, develop entropy). Eventually this will allow a 
new order or structure to emerge. What basically occurs is 
that resource constraints cause a state of nonequilibrium 
which triggers increased instability and accompanying struc- 
tural fluctuations (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). This is known 
to be the case for open systems that are chemical and biologi- 
cal in nature. The intriguing question is, does this same 
process occur in open systems that are economic or sociolog- 
ical in origin? Nicolis and Prigogine (1977) believe so, we 
also believe the answer is yes. As Henderson (1983) recently 
wrote concerning marketing strategy, "there is no reason to 
think of business competitive systems as being different in 
any fundamental way from other biological competition . . . .  
The basic principles of competition are as universal as the 
laws of chemistry and physics are universal." (Henderson, 
1983, p. 8). 
Social versus Natural Systems 
Our belief and assumption is that social and natural systems 
both undergo the same abstract systemic processes. Long ago 
Desaubliaux (1919) in the reports of the Meetings of the 
Society of the Mineral Industry 3 persuasively discussed the 
biological origins of the administrative function and argued 
that physiological man is indeed the same as the social man. 
Others have observed that biological, economic, and social 
systems are open systems (for example, Adams 1978). Fur- 
thermore, Boulding (1956, 1981) discusses how biological 
and economic or social systems are similar in terms of evolu- 
tionary and systems concepts. Also Kangun (198 I) illustrates 
how the entropy law is applicable to economic andmarketing 
processes. Measures of entropy have appeared in research in 
accounting (Adel-Khalik 1974), economics (Horowitz and 
Horowitz 1968), finance (Cozzalino and Zahner 1973), and 
marketing (I-lerniter 1973). Ayres and Nair (1984) state that 
"because goods and services incorporate mauer and energy, 
the physical sciences are clearly relevant to economics" (,13. 
62). Finally, Reidenbach and Oliva (1983) use the laws of 
thermodynamics (which deal with entropy) to provide a 
theoretical framework for examining marketing's macro sys- 
temic effects. 
The principles of thermodynamics and equilibrium statis- 
tical mechanics cannot explain the formation of new struc- 
tures and the increasing complexity of these structures. In 
other words, these laws cannot explain the type of order that 
emerges out of chaos or what is commonly referred to as 
"the order through disorder" phenomenon (Prigogine and 
Stengers 1984). What is needed to further explanation in a 
marketing context, is the recognition that economic systems 
are open systems that are often far from equilibrium. Such 
systems are able to maintain and reproduce themselves be- 
cause of a continuous exchange of energy and matter with the 
surroundings (Prigogine, Nicolis, and Babloyantz 1972a, pp. 
23-24). One framework developed by Prigogine describes a 
thermodynamic model of nonequilibrium systems which 
shows that nonequilibrium may become a source of order;, 
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essentially fluctuations in the structure of a system are stabi- 
lized by exchanges with the outside world and a new order 
thus emerges.* However, the emergence of this new order is 
essentially stochastic in nature. Although his examples are 
in chemistry, it has been argued that the theory has applic- 
ability to all nonequilibrium open systems (Dowling 1983; 
Mamyama 1978). 
Resource Constraints and Structural Fluctuations 
The preceding discussion argues that economic and social 
systems are open systems where resource constraints are 
triggered far from equilibrium which then catalyze structural 
fluctuations. However, it is difficult for us to hypothesize the 
exact causal direction between resource constraints and struc- 
tural fluctuations. This is because increased structural fluc- 
tuations may result in less resource efficiency and thus 
increase resource constraints. At the same time, resource 
constraints may cause increased structural fluctuations as a 
new system order or structure is sought. We agree with 
marketers Monieson and Shapiro (1980) who point out that 
functionalists believe scarcities (resource constraints) cause 
social change (structural fluctuations). For example, the 
shortage of oil in the early 1970's (a macroenvironmental 
resource constrain0 caused a shakeout of retail service sta- 
tions that had provided the consumer with gasoline for their 
automobiles. In order to increase their probability of survival, 
many full service stations became "self service" operations. 
This coping mechanism represented a structural adjustment. 
The structural fluctuation created a shortage in automotive 
services (another resource constraint) which provided the 
opportunity for other retailers (specialists, such as tire and 
muffler dealers) to expand their automotive services (a new 
structural adjustmenO to fill the void. Thus, using the argu- 
ments of the above discussion, the first hypothesis that we 
suggest is: 
HI: Structural fluctuatious and resource constraints 
are positively correlated; as one rises so does the 
other. 
Competitive Intensity 
Structural fluctuations and resource constraints are part of 
the turbulent macroenvironment. However the business 
firm---our strategic unit ofconcenv-is most directly buffeted 
by the competitive environment. The competitive environ- 
ment consists of the rivalrous activity of independent organ- 
izations attempting to secure mutually desired resources of 
limited supply (adapted from Porter 1980). This brings to the 
fore a third derived construct---competitive intensity which 
we defme as the strength of rivalrous activity in the competi- 
tive environment. 
Both structural fluctuations and resource constraints can be 
expected to have an impact on competitive intensity. When 
existing structures begin to dissipate their energy then re- 
sources that were previously bonded to those structures may 
decouple and have improved mobility. When resources can 
move more freely, both entry and exit barriers are lower 
(Porter 1980). Typically, this situation will attract a greater 
number of competitors than previously existed in the market. 
However, not all key resources can be accommodated by 
reduced barriers to entry. For example, managerial talent with 
appropriate experience and patent protected production 
capability (for instance) cannot easily be increased. Thus, as 
key resources become more scarce, there will be more rival- 
rous activity since the same number or more players are 
chasing a finite resource supply. The same holds tree when 
the absolute level of available resources declines, but the 
number of players who wish to participate stays about 
the same. For example, the extreme profit pressures upon the 
steel industry during the past decade reduced production 
capacity in certain world markets (such as the U.S.) and 
resulted in a surplus of experienced executive talent (some 
with personal capital to invest) who were looking for employ- 
menL This and other factors led to the construction of modem 
"mini mills" to produce certain specialty steels which further 
intensified sectors of this competitive environment. This dis- 
cussion suggests two hypotheses: 
H2: Inctraased resource constraints are associated 
with higher competitive intensity. 
H3: Increased structural fluctuations are associated 
with higher competitive intensity. 
It should be noted again that if one views structural fluctua- 
tions and resource constraints as macroenvironmental factors 
associated with a turbulent environment then the work of 
Metcal fe (1974) also supports these two hypotheses. Metcal fe 
states, "Crises brought about by the inability to cope with 
environmental change force organizations to compete and 
conflict in ways which systematically and unavoidably 
frustrate each others" policies" (p. 653). The work of Glasser 
and Halliday (1980) would also support our hypotheses. This 
pair of authors suggest that "environmental pressures disturb 
the organization's stability or equilibrium over time" 
(Glasser and Halliday 1980, p. 920). Thus, this increased 
environmental turbulence would be expected to elicit in- 
creased competitive intensity. 
Paradigm Component #2: Conduct 
As a theoretical construct, conduct is def'med as the pattern 
of behavior that a business firm follows in adapting and 
adjusting to the environment (adapted from Preston 1977, p. 
34). A business firm is confronted by an environment that 
continuously changes; but the f'mn cannot react to every 
change. All of these changes are not relevant to a particular 
firm. If it reacted to everything, the organization would be so 
flexible as to lessen its survival potential (Cook 1980). This 
is because organizational change creates a certain degree of 
organizational anxiety or tension. Thus, top management 
often wishes to minimize such tension (Watson 1972). Rather 
it would appear more likely that a firm responds only to those 
forces that increase competitive intensity (Henderson 1983). 
As Henderson put it,' 'The strength of any marketing strategy, 
depends on the competitive analysis upon which it is based" 
(p. 7). This would suggest that unless a macroenvironmental 
force affects an industry and results in a change in competi- 
tive intensity, a firm's conduct will not be substantially al- 
tered. 
Since the purpose of this research was to provide only a 
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.~r assessment of the structure-conduct-perfor- 
paradigm, we decided to focus on one (fairly com- 
~ ensive) element of the firm's conduct. However, we 
wanted ~t to be a type of conduct that represented a broad 
~ n s e  to competitive intensity. Since competition in the 
O.S' is largely characterized by monopolistic and oligopolis- 
~tiC enmpetition, the most typical responses to increased com- 
l~titive intensity involve increased emphasis on nonprice 
marketing strategies. These consist of strategies that focus on 
product, promotion, and distribution elements of the market- 
ing mix. Nonprice marketing strategies have grown in 
popularity because many price changes can be quickly dupli- 
Cated while nonprice strategies can be used to differentiate 
the firm's offering and actually give it more lasting appeal 
(Shaw 1912; Lockley 1964; Udell 1972). This approach has 
been recognized in general economic theory since Chamber- 
lain (1958) articulated his vision of product differentiation. 
In short, nonprice strategies allow the firm to alter the shape 
of its demand curve rather than simply moving along the same 
curve. Thus our fourth hypothesis is: 
H4: Increased competitive intensity will result in 
more emphasis on nonprice marketing strategies. 
Paradigm Component #3: Performance 
The final linkage in the SCP paradigm is performance. 
Performance as a theoretical construct is defined as the ac- 
complishments or outcomes of an entity. The derived con- 
struct is business performance which we define as the total 
economic results of the activities undertaken by an organiza- 
tion. 
It is not easy to speculate about how conduct in the form 
of nonprice strategies may influence business performance. 
One could expect that a rational economic person operating 
as a manager wouldn't engage in nonprice strategy unless it 
would increase organizational performance. Of course, this 
assumes that managers have perfect information or make 
decisions under certainty. This is seldom (if ever) the case 
because the manager faces uncertainty about the slopes of 
demand and supply curves and about the host of environmen- 
tal forces that influence their shape (Alchian 1950, p. 212). 
Lazer and Kelley (1962) state that most marketing systems 
are open systems in which chance and probability play a key 
role and for which planning is difficult. 
It can be argued that many businesses in the U.S. operate 
in what Emery and Trist (1965) and Dowling (1983) refer 
to as turbulent environments. These are environments in 
which the rate of change in the environment is high and the 
organization has a high level of interdependency with en- 
vironmental elements. In a turbulent environment the level 
of uncertainty is high. It can also be argued that f'nms would 
not require a "risk" premium on investment projects if the 
world or environments they operated in were certain. If 
capital costs a firm 12 percent and the firm targets new 
investment projects to return 25 percent, then the fkm likely 
perceives a high degree of environmental uncertainty. Using 
a more pragmatic line of reasoning, perhaps what makes 
business so exciting and captivating to a continuous flow of 
new "players" is its inherent riskiness and uncertainty. In the 
language of the street, "business is a game of high stakes 
poker." 
The inherent uncertainty in the environment does not 
prevent managers from attempting to make very thoughtful 
decisions about strategy that they see fitting the environment 
that will unfold in the future. Clearly, managers~the players 
of the business game---perceive that their strategy adjust- 
ments should finally lead to improved organizational perfor- 
mance. This is the essense of contingency theory which posits 
that managers adjust their controllable strategies to the en- 
vironment in order to enhance f'mancial outcomes (Hofer and 
Schendel 1978; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In marketing, 
this is also the conventional wisdom. As Day (1984) has 
noted, the "ultimate test" of the effectiveness of a strategy 
is its impact upon outcomes including sales growth, 
profitability, and economic value generation. Similarly, 
Aaker (1984) in his commentaries concerning the evaluation 
of objectives and strategy has observed that "the ultimate 
bottom line test" of strategy outcomes is seen in its influence 
upon profitability. In fact, one of the most famous ongoing 
data bases upon which marketing academics have based their 
strategy insights is called PIMS---an acronym for profit im- 
pact of marketing strategies. The very name suggests that 
there is necessarily a relationship between strategy and profit 
(Ramanujum and Venkatramon 1984). Thus, as the environ- 
ment becomes more competitive and management turns to 
increasing use of nonpriee competitive strategies, we would 
expect that managers also perceive that their strategy adjust- 
ments will lead to increased business performance. Stated 
formally: 
H5: Increased emphasis on nonprice marketing 
strategies is related to an expectation of higher 
business performance. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Shortcomings of Traditional Methods 
The traditional methods of collecting ~ t a  to test the struc- 
ture-conduct-performance paradigm are plagued with prob- 
lems. For example, to test the proposed hypotheses many 
approaches are possible. Perhaps the ideal approach would be 
to collect (a) objective historical data on resource constraints, 
structural fluctuations, and competitive intensity; Co) infor- 
mation concerning the firm's use of nonprice strategies; as 
well as (c) measures of organizational performance. Except 
for the latter measure this task is close to impossible. In truth, 
even the measurement of organizational performance would 
be difficult because of the confounding factors of mergers, 
tax laws unique to specific industries, differing accounting 
methods (that is, LIFO versus FIFO inventory valuation), and 
problems of historical versus current value accounting. In 
regard to the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of in- 
dustrial organization economics, Carman (1977, p. 150) has 
stated that . . . "  there are serious measurement problems 
which are sufficient to discourage all but the strongest 
scholars.'" 
Of extreme difficulty is the measurement of fum conduct. 
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Scherer states that firm conduct has been difficult to analyze 
quantitatively but at least its consequences are observable in 
terms of performance indicators (Scherer 1980, p. 268). He 
notes, "The typical slructure-performance analysis excludes 
explicit conduct variables, partly because they are so hard to 
measure and partly because it is believed that performance 
can be "explained' statistically merely on the basis of vari- 
ables reflecting market structure and fundamental supply and 
demand conditions" (Scherer 1980, p. 276). 
Executive Perceptions versus Objective Data 
One method for partially overcoming the preceding prob- 
lems is to obtain executive perceptions of the major constructs 
in the hypotheses. That is, executive perceptions could be 
obtained of indicators of resource constraints, structural fluc- 
tuations, competitive intensity, nonpdce marketing strate- 
gies, and organ izational performance. Robey (1982) contends 
that the weight of research supports the relationship between 
executive perceptions of the strategic situation and sub- 
sequent organizational actions. This approach has the prag- 
matic advantage of being doable. In marketing, the utilization 
of a sample of executive perceptions is common in order to 
set the stage for a conceptual or empirical treatment of an 
emerging issue (Montgomery and Weinberg 1979; Webster 
1981; Hunt and Chonko 1984). The idea is to integrate 
multiple and diverse executive opinions in a manner which 
indicates what the emerging trends might be concerning a 
particular marketing development. 
Executive perceptions could be obtained about the past, 
present, or future. The major problem in gathering executive 
perceptions of the past is that today's executives were likely 
to not have been in senior management positions during the 
time period for which they would be questioned. Essentially, 
they would not be reliable, key-informants of the organiza- 
tion's past behavior. On the other hand, the obstacle in gather- 
ing perceptions of the present is that the responding 
executives might rationalize their present decisions and be- 
havior. The last alternative is to gather perceptions of the 
future, this was the approach selected. 
Futures Research Methodology 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the 
application of futures research techniques to business 
forecasting and planning. Fawles (1978) among others, 
provides an anthology of the purposes and methods of futures 
research. In marketing planning, two techniques have been 
especially prominent: the Delphi and scenarios. For example, 
Pearce and Robinson (1983) discuss the critical relationship 
between the Delphi and environmental scanning as it is 
evolving in the market analysis of many organizations. Lin- 
nemann and Klein (1985) have documented the growing use 
of scenarios as an aid to strategic decision-making. In effect, 
we implemented a hybrid approach to futures research by 
utilizing dements of both the Delphi and the scenario tech- 
nique. Our sample group of experts---high level Fortune 500 
executives---is the fundamental feature of the Delphi ap- 
proach. A series of statements about the possible importance 
of various strategies constituted a disaggregated scenario 
technique. As Edmundo (1982; p. 45) has noted: " . . .  micro 
and macro interactions are the essense of which business 
strategy and policy is made . . .  A plausible approach to 
dealing with these complex interactions is to pursue futures 
studies as a mode of examining the probabilities of alternative 
future scenarios and then checking which events of the 
scenarios unfold." In accordance with the above, we recorded 
the perceptions that executives hold of the environment of 
business in 1995 as well as the emphasis they thought would 
be placed on nonprice marketing strategies. In addition, the 
executives were asked to state their expectations of organiza- 
tional performance in 1995 in light of their other predictions. 
Ten years in the future is of a sufficiently long time horizon 
that responses should not be tainted by current prejudices, 
biases, or vested interests. Most executives ten years from 
now will be in a different position in the organization or 
retired, or employed elsewhere and thus their responses about 
the organization in 1995 should be unfettered by self-serving 
concerns. We also believe that theory testing can occur via 
collecting data about perceptions of the future (Lusch and 
Laczniak 1979) because executives have rudimentary 
theories of the "if  A then B" type which direct and guide 
their behavior. Zaltman, LeMasters, and Heffring (1982) 
refer to these as"theory in use." Wilson and Ghingold (1980 
p. 236) suggest that the theory-in-use "approach to theory 
building represents a more inductive, inferential process and 
is based on a simple notion that individual practitioners 
develop personal rules of action which can be codified into a 
theory." The futures research methodology developed in this 
article is a covert way of identifying these rules of action. In 
brief, if we ask executives about the future then we should be 
able to determine what they will do (action B) if confronted 
with situation A. And these uncovered " i f  A then B" rela- 
tions would likely extend to the decision rules which guide 
their current behavior. 
Surveyed Population 
The population we surveyed consisted of Fortune 500 
executives. The questionnaire was eight pages and consisted 
of a large battery of questions about the business environ- 
ment, the firm's conduct, and expected business performance 
in 1995. Only the subset of these questions that relate to the 
constructs in the hypotheses developed, are used in the re- 
search reported in this article. Questionnaires were sent by 
mail and a total of 103 usable responses were obtained. All 
of the respondents were high level executives----typically 
VP's of Marketing or Planning. Clearly, all qualified as 
organizational elites who were keenly knowledgeable of or- 
ganizational strategy. A second wave of the questionnaires 
was not mailed because it was our experience that large 
organizations typically have policies or strong opinions about 
responding to unsolicited questionnaires; if they don't 
respond the fu'st time they are unlikely to respond to further 
prodding. 
Statistical Method 
Structural equations with unobservable or latent constructs 
were used to test the hypotheses using the LISREL program 
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ad Sorbom (1983). This statistical method al- 
tssessment of both the measurement of con- 
structural relationship between constructs. The 
ltrix between indicators of the constructs will 
, input in the LISREL program. 
~ ~ , e m e n t  
~ i t 2  provides information on how the structure con- 
~ ~ r c  measured and their associated scale statistics. 
[ ~ ' i c o n s t r a i n t s  was measured by the summated score 
that reflected the likelihood that resource con- 
~ ~ o u l d  substantially occur by 1995. The likelihood 
E h~ad six points: 0 percent, 20 percent, 40 percent, 60 
~ 80 percent, 100 percent. The items included in this 
~ , w e r e  developed by reviewing the literature concern- 
future U.S. and global environment as reported by 
~ e a l s  such as the Futurist, the Trend Analysis Program 
~ i ~ e  American Council of Life Insurance, the Naisbett 
.~n0t~ and the Center for Futures Research at the University 
off, Southern California. 
The final pool of items represented a judgment call by the 
authors, and as shown in Exhibit 2, included such resource 
dimensions as education, petroleum, and food availability. 
This scale had a standardized coefficient alpha of .77 which 
suggested it had adequate reliability for basic research (Nun- 
nally 1967). Structural fluctuations was measured by the 
summated score on eleven items that reflected the likelihood 
that systemic fluctuations would substantially occur by 1995. 
The items included in this measure were developed in a 
manner analogous to the resource constraints construct. The 
f'mal pool of these items, also enumerated in Exhibit 2, 
includes such structural fluctuations as inflation, unemploy- 
ment, consumerism, technological backlash, and so forth. The 
standardized coefficient alpha for this scale was .79; which 
was an acceptable indicator of reliability. 
One of the fundamental differences between the items 
listed under resource constraints and structural fluctuations is 
that the former tend to represent inputs whereas the latter are 
generally reactions of the system. While there may be some 
debate among reasonable persons about the placement of 
some of the items (for example, unemployment), we should 
recall that both factors are dimensions of the turbulent en- 
vironment and that they are postulated to act in tandem to 
influence competitive intensity and strategy. Finally, com- 
petitive intensity was measured by three items, each scored 
on a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strong- 
ly agree. The measures of competitive intensity included an 
item reflecting input (increased spending on marketing), out- 
put (maintenance of market share) as well as a global 
measure. Respondents were also asked to state their degree 




Scale and Items Correlation Alpha 
Resource Constraints OCI) .77 
An infrastructure crisis (affecting roads, schools, public services) will be pervasive in many cities. .27 
The quality of public education at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels will be a major concern .29 
throughout the 1990's. 
E/ghty percent of married households will be two-income households. .40 
Increased global pollution requiting substantial international cooperation. .57 
Worldwide straggle over rights to mine the oceans. .54 
Worldwide shortages of food occur. .36 
Worldwide shortages of oil occur. .37 
A significant water shortage develops in at least five states in the U.S. .52 
The oceans will be a frontier for major scientific developments. .58 
Space will be 9 frontier for major scientific developments. .50 
Struczural Fluctations (X2) 
There will be a pt'evailing climate of social and ethical problems caused by advancing technology. 
A oon~mer becklash against HI-TECH Developmenu such as biogenetlcs and electronics funds tnmsfer. 
The U.S. adopts an indmarial policy whereby the federal goven~n~t assists key industries 
to be wodd-con~tltive. 
There will be 9 movement toward the use of more outside directors that represent ~3ckholdez groups 
inch as labor, comumen, the community, etc. 
The U& enacts meumes which severely restrict foreign investment in the U.S. 
A revival of eonmmerism to 1960's levels of intemity will occur. 
Unemployment exceeding t0 percent in most developed countries. 
There will be major efforts to develop international codes of conduct for the operation of multinationah. 
Inflalion exceeding 15 percent in most developed countries. 
Widesp~ad political and financial instability in less-developed countries causing wmldwide eecmomic instability. 
A climate of protectionism characterized by periodic international trade wars and the formation of regional 
alliances to inca~-.ase leverage in world trade. 
Competitive Intensity 
Firms will be spending more of each sales dollar in madceting due to increased competition. (YI) ~ s in onr industry will be aggressively fighting to hold onto their share of the madcet. (Y2) 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Conduct And Performance Measurement 
Scale and ltems hem-total Standardized Scale and ltems Item-total Standardized 
Correlation Alpha Correlation Alpha 
Product Strategy(Y4) .66 Broadcast media advertising on radio/ .48 
television. 
Pmtude service such as  product installation, .30 
maintenance, and warranty/guarantee service. Media advertising on cable "IV, over-the-air .22 
pay "IV, and videodiscs. 
Presalc service such as product application .34 
cnfmcering. Distribution S tr at e gy (g~) .75 
Product research relating to the development .40 Manufacturer's efforts to develop and assist .54 
of product styling and fashions, the channel of distribution. 
Technical research, development, and .48 Selection of individual establishments within .54 
laboratory tcging of new products and L-n- the basic channels. 
provements of existing products. 
Determination of the basic channels of dis- .46 
Market research relating to product planning .56 tfilmfion to be utilized. 
and development, and product testing. 
Warehousing and inventory control. .57 
Promotion Strategy (Y~) .62 
Transpoasaion. .48 
Specialpromo.ional activities such as promo- .42 
tionsl warranties, trade shows, dealer aids, and Business Performance .9O 
product displays. 
Our overall financial performance will be less .83 
Public relations, public affair,, and corn- .32 than satisfactory. 0"7) 
inanity relations. 
Our firm will be operating doee to its .62 
Product branding and promotional packaging. .40 breakeven point. (Y$) 
Sales manageatent and Personal selling, in- .23 Our return on assets will be less than sadsfac- .85 
9 all sales management activities (for tory. 0"9) 
example, training, supc~rLsion, etc.) and the 
sales efforts of your company management Corporate liquidity will be less than satisfac- .72 
perumnel, tory. (Yt0) 
Prim media advemsing in newspaper, .26 Ourretum on stockholder's equity will beless .77 
magazines, and bro~ures, than satisfactory. (Yll) 
in 1995. The standardized coefficient for this scale was .71 
and evidenced acceptable reliability for the competitive in- 
tensity construct. 
Exhibit 3 provides information on the measurement of the 
conduct and performance constructs. Nonprice marketing 
strategy was indicated by three scales. The items from these 
three scales came from research by Udell (1972), Lusch, 
Laezniak, and Udell (1976) and Robicheaux (1976). The 
product strategy scale consisted of five items scored on a 
five-point scale that ranged from gready decreased impor- 
tance to greatly increased importance. The executives were 
told to indicate the degree to which they believed that the 
respective elements of marketing strategy would increase or 
decrease in importance by 1995. The product strategy scale 
had a coefficient alpha of .66. The promotion strategy scale 
was scored on the same five-point rating and was comprised 
of seven items. The scale had a coefficient of .62. The third 
scale was distribution strategy and it had a coefficient of .75. 
It was scored in a fashion similar to the previous two scales 
and had five items. 
Business performance was measured with five items (see 
Exhibit 3) reflecting perceptions of return on assets, liquidity, 
breakeven points, return on equity, and a global measure of 
financial performance in 1995. Again, the notion is consistent 
with the position of Enis (1982) that financial performance is 
usually an indicator of how well an organization is serving 
consumers in its marketplace. Executives responded to the 
above mentioned items on a four-point rating scale that went 
from strongly disagree to agree. The rating scale was reverse 
scored so high numbers would reflect high performance. The 
coefficient alpha for the summated scale of these five items 
was .90. Thus, in essense 103 high-level executives were 
being asked to comment on fundamental dimensions of the 
external business environment in 1995. Based on the vision 
which they project, they were asked about how such an 
environment might affect nonprice competitive strategies and 
what the outcome on organizational performance might be. 
In effect, the unit of analysis in this study was to evaluate the 
determinants and outcomes of strategy at the corporate level. 
Recent writings have emphasized the importance of evaluat- 
ing strategy at the corporate level (Wind and Robertson 1983) 
but empirical efforts in this realm have been in short supply 
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with a few notable exceptions (Hutt, Ireland, and Stadter, 
1982). 
RESULTS 
The Lisrel model to be tested is presented in Exhibit 4. This 
model has six structural parameters and five of these refer to 
the five hypotheses: H1 suggests that phi should be postive; 
H2 suggests that gamma-1 should be positive; H3 hypoth- 
esizes a positive value for gamma-2; H4 suggests that beta- 1 
should be positive; and H5 predicts that beta-2 will be posi- 
five. The sixth structural parameter is beta-3 which shows a 
direct structural linkage betw~n competitive intensity and 
business performance. We did not formally hypothesize this 
link but it is reasonable to expect that competitive intensity 
has a direct effect on business performance as well as a 
possible indirect effect via its influence on nonprice market- 
ing strategy. The conventional wisdom of economics would 
suggest that beta-3 would be negative, increased competitive 
intensity is associated with lower business performance 
(Porter 1980). 
The parameter estimates for the Lisrel Model are presented 
in Exhibit 5. 
The first hypothesis is strongly supported since the phi 
parameter is .422 and statL~tically signiirr~,ant beyond the .01 
level. Resource constraints and structural flUCtuations arc 
positively associated. This suggests that a systems interpreta- 
tion of business environmental turbulence may be on target. 
The second hypothesis also received slrong support since 
the gamma- 1 parameter was .346 and significant beyond the 
.01 level. Increased resource constraints are a.~ociateA with 
higher levels of competitive intensity. This is in consonance 
with the earlier articulated view that economic competition 
may be regulated by the same forces as biological competi- 
tion. 
The third hypothesis cannot be supported since gamma-2 
is not statiscally significant. Increased structural fluctuations 
are not associated with higher levels of competitive intensity. 
This outcome was a surprise. It seems to suggest that certain 
systemic dynamics---for instance, inflation, consumerism, 
and protectionism--c, an be increasing without directly sig- 
nilicantly altering the competitive climate. 
Strong support is obtained for the fourth hypothesis since 
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EXHIBIT 5 
Parameter Estimates for Llsrel Model 
Parameter M a x i m u m  t - v a l u e  Standardized 
Likelihood Solution 
Estimate 
~.l 1.000" N/A .g79 
Z1 1.000' N/A .890 
Z3 1.000" N/A .666 
Z( .801 4.25 .533 
Xs 1.145 5.15 .762 
X6 1.000" N/A .513 
~7 i .224 3.50 .627 
9 895 3.03 .459 
1.000" N/A .815 
~d0 .860 7.78 .701 
~,u 1.173 11.70 .956 
7,42 .845 7.59 .688 
;Lt3 .998 9.54 .813 
~l .228" NIA 
51 .208* N/A 
(:l .557 5.19 
(:2 .716 6.18 
~3 .419 3.89 
e( .737 5.82 
(:5 .606 4.68 
(:6 .789 6.15 
(:7 .336 6.01 
8s .509 6.61 
(:9 .086 2.31 
(:io .526 6.64 
(:11 .339 6.03 
yl .346 2.63 .456 
-.087 -.72 -.  117 
131 .609 3.46 .791 
[$2 .061 .12 .039 
I~ -.103 -.27 --.084 
$ .422 3.89 .540 
*C,m.~ained parameter. 
NIA Not applicable. 
beta- 1 is .609 and statistically significant Increased competi- 
tive intensity is associated with increased emphasis on 
nonprice marketing strategy. This implies that business exe- 
cutives are active participants in the business game. As the 
competitive vice tightens, they strive to take steps which will 
presumably alleviate the pressures of competition. 
Hypothesis-five is not supported; while beta-2 is positive, 
it is not statistically significant. Increased emphasis on non- 
price marketing strategy is therefore unrelated to business 
performance. This outcome is very surprising and will be 
discussed in detail in the section below. 
Finally it should be noted that beta-3 is negative as ex- 
9 pected, however, it is not statistically significant. Increased 
competitive intensity is unrelated to business performance. 
This result is also not intuitively appealing and it will be 
discussed shortly. 
DISCUSSION 
What has this initial assessment of the SCP paradigm 
revealed. 9 It has provided evidence which suggests that (a) 
executives believe that a turbulent macroenvironment (main- 
ly as represented in resource constraints) influences eompeti- 
tive intensity and that (b) organizations will respond to in- 
creased competitive pressure with more emphasis on non- 
price marketing strategies. Thus, as expected, structural 
elements in the external environment are instrumental in 
affecting strategy. However, somewhat more problematic, we 
find no direct relationship between the level of competitive 
intensity and expected business performance. Moreover, we 
find that executives project no linkage between the increased 
usage of nonprice marketing strategies and long-run business 
performance. Does this suggest that executives believe their 
nonprice marketing strategies in response to competitive con- 
ditions are futile? Not at all. First, the fact. that there is no 
relationship between strategy and performance is not to say 
that the relationship between strategy and performance is 
negative. It may be that reliance upon particular strategies in 
time of macroenvironmental turbulence is exactly what 
prevents the negative relationship from occuring. Also, in- 
creased nonprice strategies are precisely what we would 
expect to find in intensely competitive markets. Increases in 
advertising or new product introductions by one competitor 
will garner a similar reaction from other competitors. In this 
manner, the stakes of the game increase, but the probabilities 
of success do not. Hence, the lack of a stronger relationship 
between conduct and performance is not altogether surpris- 
ing. As Aaker (1984) and others have observed, tactical 
efforts to hold on to gains in market share are difficult. In 
general, the greater the extent to which the competition recog- 
nizes growth opportunities, the more difficult it is for the 
individual firm to grow and be profitable 0Vensley 1982). In 
addition, it should be granted that nonprice strategies may 
influence short-term performance but in the long run they 
may be a minor factor. 
Many executives may believe that the multitude of random 
shocks from the external environment primarily determines 
the fortunes and doom of U.S. business over the long pull. 
The best thought-out plans and strategies may be destroyed 
by supposedly random events. From an organizational 
psychology standpoint, this finding may be consistent with 
some of the theories of Rotter (1966; 1975) who argues that 
there are many managers who perceive that events are exter- 
nally controlled. In other words, they believe most outcomes 
are the result of external causes rather than their own actions. 
Experience with failures of the past may have reinforced in 
managers' minds that hard work and planning may or may 
not pay off. Or it may suggest that many outcomes in business 
are stochastic, that is, they are the result of "business luck." 
We believe this business luck thesis is worth further inves- 
tigation because it is especially intriguing. 
Many strategic decisions may be nothing more than in- 
formed speculation. This speculation may result in the correct 
guess. As Alchian stated in the Journal of Political Economy 
in 1950, "Even in a world of stupid men there would still be 
profits. Also, the greater the uncertainties of the world, the 
greater is the possibility that profits would go to venturesome 
and lucky rather than to logical, careful, fact-gathering in- 
dividuals." (p. 213). Thus, the link between reasoned action 
and profits may be nil. Furthermore, the observance of suc- 
cessful finns year after year is no proof that reasoned action 
led to success; the repeated success could be due to luck! As 
support for this position consider the chance model of Borel, 
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the renowned French mathematician (as reported by Alchian 
1950, p. 215). 
Suppose two million Parisians were paired off 
and set to tossing coins in a game of matching. 
Each pair plays until the winner on the first toss 
is again brought to equality with the other player. 
Assuming one toss per second for each eight- 
hour day, at the end of ten years there would still 
be, on the average, about a hundred-odd pairs; 
and if the players assign the game to their heirs, 
a dozen or so will still be playing at the end of a 
thousand years! The implications are obvious. 
Suppose that some business had been operating 
for one hundred years. Should one rule out luck 
and chance as the essence of the factors produc- 
ing the long-term survival of the enterprise? No 
inference whatever can be drawn until the num- 
ber of original participants is known; and even 
then one must know the size, risk, and frequency 
of each commitment. One can see from the Borel 
illustration the danger in concluding that there are 
too many firms with long lives in the real world 
to admit an important role to chance. On the 
contrary, one might insist that there are actually 
too few! 
What we are essentially asking, is what does organizational 
success or firm survival signal? According to Monieson and 
Shapiro (1980) survival of an institution to the functionalist 
"is considered 'per se' evidence that institution is performing 
a service which is useful and possibly even essential to 
society" (13. 9). On the other hand, these same authors argue 
a more contemporary postulate is that "evolution is a matter 
of blind chance with survival depending on genetic fimess 
rather than any recognized degree of usefulness to a larger 
entity" (p. 9). Thus, according to Monieson and Shapiro 
(1980) survival is due to being genetically fit by serving 
society. The important point to note however, is that neither 
of these explanations supercede a "luck" hypothesis. If 
"serving" and being "genetically fit" are stochastic versus 
deterministic processes then luck can explain both causes. 
That is, those that survived served society but serving may 
have been stochastic; furthermore those that were genetically 
fit survived but being blessed with genetic fimess may have 
been stochastic. Any expost facto differentiating charac- 
teristics between survivors and nonsurvivors does not rule out 
stochastic processes. For example, surviving firms could be 
shown to have superior managers to nonsurviving firms but 
this does not suggest that surviving was determininistic. The 
allocation of managers to firms may have been stochastic and 
thus survival was stochastic. 
The largest stream of research that would support a link 
between marketing strategy and business performance is the 
PIMS research project (Buzzel, Gale, and Sultan 1975; 
Buzzel and Weirsema 1981). In this series of research, several 
actions or strategies are shown to relate to ROI. Perhaps one 
of the strongest and most talked about links to be discovered 
was between market share and ROI. Supposedly high market 
share leads to high ROI although recent writings such as 
Jacobson and Aaker (1985) have gone far to diffuse this 
theory. Thus, it is possible that this link could also be due to 
business luck or chance. An example by Maucke (1974) can 
illuminate this possibility. A consortium of oil companies of 
which Phillips Petroleum Company was managing partner 
announced discovery of a seven-billion barrel oil field in the 
North Sea in 1970. In the following years because of this 
largely chance discovery, Phillips market share and profits 
rose. In short, the positive correlation between market share 
and profits was due to luck. Is this an isolated example? 
Perhaps noL The simultaneous rise in profits and market share 
at General Motors beginning in the early 1920s was largely 
due to Henry Ford refusing to deviate from his historical, 
production oriented, winning strategy. If G.M. had not been 
so lucky as to have a competitor that refused to innovate, the 
market share and profits at G.M. would not have been so 
strongly correlated. The origin of Levi-Strauss company 
presents a similar example drawn from the annals of business 
history. When Strauss left for the west coast of the U.S. during 
the 1849 gold rush, he did so with the intention of selling 
denim tents. However, what he found out was that the miners 
needed durable pants rather than tents. Thus, chance and 
necessity became the parents of an American clothing tradi- 
tion as well as what is today the world's largest purveyor of 
jeans. 
In yet another line of reasoning the link between strategy 
(or conduct) and performance is also attributed to chance. 
Lippman and Rumelt (1982) believe that the world is am- 
biguous and as a result organizations have trouble identifying 
the factors that cause business success. The only way a firm 
can discover its actual demand or cost function for a new 
technology or new strategy is to make a nonrecoverable 
investment. Because of this ambiguity, successful strategies 
are not efficiently imitated and the factors of production are 
not highly mobile (that is, because few others know the true 
value of these factors). Thus winning profit strategies cannot 
be imitated and strategy and performance end up being unre- 
lated. They suggest that " . . .  all f'h'mS act to maximize net 
expected wealth and some are just 'luckier' than others." As 
it happens the history of business is replete with examples of 
nonprice strategies that did not help business but actually 
harmed business performance. This is not to deny the success- 
ful implementation of countess profitable strategies. The 
data does not suggest that nonprice strategy harms business 
performance. If harming business was the dominant result of 
nonprice strategy, such behavior would eventually be extin- 
guished by fmms because engaging in the behavior would 
make them more vulnerable to extinction. Consequently, we 
are left with the uneasy notion that the relationship between 
strategy and performance is unclear. Recent reviews of the 
empirical literature related to the issue end up articulating a 
similar position (Shrader, Taylor, and Dalton 1984). 
If the preceding is a correct assessment--and it may or may 
not be--what are the implications? From a public policy 
perspective, it could be argued that if organizational conduct 
doesn't influence long-run business performance then at- 
tempting to regulate competition by altering the structure of 
an industry may be fruitless. Barriers to entry such as heavy 
investments in advertising and other forms of nonprice 
marketing strategy may have little influence on ultimate 
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success. Thus, using legislation to change industry structure 
or reduce barriers will not eliminate the formation of large 
and very powerful business fwms. The bottom line, although 
disquieting to some public policymakers, is that in the 
sweepstakes for business fortunes some firms will win big 
and others will struggle with a mediocre existence regardless 
of industry structure and business conduct. 
From a managerial perspective, this research suggests that 
firms be prepared to respond aggressively to random shocks, 
in the environment. If long-run business performance is not 
greatly influenced by nonprice marketing sWategy and if it is 
caused by random shocks, then firms must monitor these 
shocks and translate them into opportunities. Importantly, 
these shocks cannot be readily predicted. Thus a firm must 
have an agile scanning mechanism in conjunction with a 
flexible marketing organization. 
Before any of these implications are strongly embraced 
much more refinement of the SCP paradigm is necessary. We 
only tapped a small set of environmental forces and types of 
conduct. The door is ajar for more research using this 
paradigm along with the futures research method that was 
utilized in this article. 
NOTES 
1. In some strict interpretations of the industrial organiza- 
tion/market structure literature, structure refers to market struc- 
ture and not the sm~ctural aspects of other external 
environments; conduct includes behavior other than marketing 
decisions, for example, it includes research and development 
and legal actions; and performance refers to more than organ- 
izational performance but to macro systemiC performance 
measures such as equity, full employment, and production and 
allocative efficiency (see Carman 1977). However, there are 
other interpretations which urge both a more flexible and 
comprehensive interpretation of these variables (Preston 
1977). This article follows this lauer approach. 
2. The definitions we will offer have been influenced by many 
individuals, but most notably Buzzell (1972), Preston (1977), 
Serpkenci (1984), Stem and Grabner (1970), and Vernon 
(1972). 
3. For an English translation of this manuscript see Schumacher 
(1984). 
4. Presented in a lecture delivered in Stockholm, Sweden in 
December 1977 when be received the Nobel Prize in 
Chemistry. 
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